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I. INTRODUCTION
The number of HIV patients needing medication will continue to rise
beyond the year 2015. 1 The cost of HIV medication will also increase. 2 The
increase in both the number of patients and the cost of treatment will challenge
the ability of nations to provide adequate access to medicines.3 Providing for
better access, compulsory licensing 4 allows for the production of patented
pharmaceuticals at a lower cost to the consumer. 5 Although countries issue
compulsory licenses for domestic production, 6 there is only one successful
example of exportation of medication under a compulsory license: the license
issued by the Canadian government for pharmaceuticals exported to Rwanda. 7
Allowing for the exportation of medication under a compulsory license is vital
because not all countries have the ability to manufacture pharmaceuticals. 8
1

See ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP ON AIDS, THE TREATMENT TIMEBOMB 6–8 (2009),
http://www.aidsportal.org/repos/APPGTimebomb091.pdf (noting that the rise in patients needing
treatment will be due to a variety of factors, including people starting treatment earlier, staying on
medication longer, and meeting current unmet needs).
2
Id. at 10–12 (noting that the increase in cost of medications will be due to better medications
with less side effects, as well as the need for second and third line medications).
3
Id. at 5:
We can predict many of the changing treatment needs of people living
with HIV in the coming decade and they are not compatible with
treatments and prices available today. Maintaining HIV treatment to
keep people alive will cripple developing economies, or place
unbearable strains on richer countries trying to support them.
4
A compulsory license, as defined by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), is
when the authorities license companies or individuals other than the
patent owner to use the rights of the patent—to make, use, sell or
import a product under patent (i.e. a patented product or a product
made by a patented process)—without the permission of the patent
owner. Allowed under the WTO’s TRIPS (intellectual property)
Agreement provided certain procedures and conditions are fulfilled.
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, JULY 2008 PACKAGE: BRIEFING NOTES, JARGON BUSTER (2008),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/meet08_brief07_e.htm.
5
See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct
Investment: The Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 283, 283–84 (2008)
(“Developing nations have attempted to resolve this tension through the issuance of patent
compulsory licenses—authorizations for government-approved generic copies—so that those in
need of the most important new treatments can obtain them at an affordable price.”).
6
See Jamie Feldman, Note, Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers Behind the Current Practice,
8 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 137, 149 (2009) (“High, middle, and low-income nations have all issued
health related compulsory licenses.”).
7
See Mark D. Penner & Peter G. Armstrong, Removing Barriers? An Overview of the
Canadian Access to Medicines Regime, 21 I.P.J. 357, 360 (2009).
8
See Jessica L. Greenbaum, Comment, TRIPs and Public Health: Solutions for Ensuring
Global Access to Essential AIDS Medication in the Wake of the Paragraph 6 Waiver, 25 J.
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Despite this example, the Canadian Access to Medicines Regime (“CAMR”), 9
Canada’s compulsory licensing scheme, is underutilized. 10 Recently, Bill C393, 11 in the Canadian House of Commons and its complementary bill in the
Senate, Bill S-232, 12 were brought before the Canadian Parliament. These bills
propose to streamline the implementation of CAMR. 13
This paper highlights the significant changes to CAMR proposed by this
recent legislation. These changes reflect an attempt to remedy the problems of
the current regime, but in doing so they create broader rights that are not
compliant with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights 14 (TRIPs Agreement). 15 Section II of this paper discusses the international

CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 142, 151 (2008) (“Although ninety percent of those infected with
the HIV/AIDS virus live in developing countries, almost eighty percent of these countries do not
have the means necessary to produce anti-retroviral drugs.”).
9
The CAMR is part of the Canadian Patent Act and also references the Canadian Food and
Drugs Act. Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, §§ 21.01-21.2 (1985), available at http://laws.
justice.gc.ca/eng/P-4/page-6.html#anchorbo-ga:s_21_01; Canadian Food and Drugs Act, C.R.C.,
ch. 870, §§ C.01.001-C.09.035 (2009), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/F-27/page2.html#anchorbo-ga:l_II-gb:s_37.
10
See George Tsai, Note, Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime: Lessons For Compulsory
Licensing Schemes Under the WTO Doha Declaration, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1063, 1080–96 (2009)
(discussing shortcomings of the regime). It is possible that such shortcomings have resulted in a
lack of use of the regime.
11
Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, (1st
reading 25 May 2009), http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=
4329904&Language=e&Mode=1.
12
Bill S-232, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian purposes)
and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, http://www.
parl.gc.ca/content/Senate/Bills/402/public/S-232/S-232_1/S-232_text-e.htm.
13
See House of Commons Debates (12 June 2009) (Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis) (Can.),
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Pub=journals&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses
=2&Language=E&DocId=3987263&File=0#Int-2833462 [hereinafter Debates, Wasylycia-Leis].
14
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments—Results of Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197–1225,
[hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
15
See House of Commons Debates (12 June 2009) (Mr. Marc Garneau) (Can.), http://www2.
parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Pub=journals&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2&Langua
ge=E&DocId=3987263&File=0#Int-2833462 [hereinafter Debates, Garneau] (suggesting that the
proposed legislation may not be compliant with the TRIPs Agreement). While Mr. Garneau
discusses TRIPs Agreement compliance issues, he only briefly outlines several areas of concern.
This paper takes a closer look at the proposed legislation’s compliance with the TRIPs Agreement,
in the context of complaints brought against the current CAMR regime, in order to illustrate why
these changes were proposed. In addition, this paper discusses several positive steps taken by the
proposed legislation, in contrast to Mr. Garneau’s contentions.
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development of compulsory licenses for exportation, including the TRIPs
Agreement. Section III provides an overview of Canada’s current legislation as
well as Canada’s experiences under such legislation. As a contrast, India’s
current compulsory licensing regime is also set out in Section III. Next, Section
IV(A) presents the problems encountered under the current Canadian legislation.
This Section goes on to show how the proposed legislation’s answers to these
problems are not compliant with the TRIPs Agreement. However, to dismiss the
bill in its entirety would be detrimental to creating a working regime, as several of
the amendments reflect positive changes. To illustrate these positive changes,
Section IV(B) compares amendments to other nations’ legislation. The paper
concludes by discussing that while the proposed legislation should not pass as it
stands, the positive changes should guide Canada and other nations in creating
better medicine regimes.
II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND COMPULSORY LICENSING
Canada’s current medicines regime is based on international agreements and
declarations, in particular Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement and the Doha
Declaration. 16 Canada must continue to comply with these agreements in any
future legislation. 17
Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement sets out basic provisions addressing
compulsory licensing. 18 Provisions include limiting the time and scope of the
license, 19 and allowing for adequate remuneration to the rights holder. 20 Article
31 also requires the party seeking a compulsory license to negotiate with the
patent holder on reasonable commercial terms. 21 This negotiation requirement
16

TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31, at 1209–10; World Trade Organization,
Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002)
[hereinafter Doha Declaration]; see Tsai, supra note 10, at 1064 (“CAMR is based on and enabled
by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights . . . which took
effect January 1, 1995, requiring all WTO member nations to meet minimum standards in their
laws and practices regarding intellectual property protection.”).
17
The current CAMR actually goes beyond what is required under the TRIPs Agreement. See
Greenbaum, supra note 8, at 158 (“This voluntary license requirement makes the law even more
rigorous than the standards for compulsory licensing.”).
18
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31, at 1209–10.
19
Id. art. 31(c), at 1209.
20
Id. art. 31(h), at 1210.
21
Id. art. 31(b), at 1209:
[S]uch use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have
not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This
requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of
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may be waived in two circumstances: (1) a national emergency or (2) public noncommercial use. 22 Article 31 also contains several restrictions on production.23
These restrictions are the result of tensions between developed and developing
nations that were present during the negotiations. 24 The tension is notably present
in Article 31, subdivision (f), which restricts production predominantly to supply
the domestic market. 25 This restriction presented a barrier for developing nations
that lack adequate manufacturing capabilities. 26
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) member countries recognized Article
31(f) as a burden on developing countries when preparing the Doha Declaration. 27
The Doha Declaration states that the TRIPs Agreement “can and should be
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.” 28
Since Article 31(f) presented a barrier to accessing medicines, the Doha
Declaration provided that the TRIPs Council should come up with a solution to
the Article 31(f) problem. 29

public non-commercial use. In situations of national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall,
nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case
of public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor,
without making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to
know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the
right holder shall be informed promptly.
22

Id.
Id. art. 31(c), (f), at 1209–10 (stating, for example, that the use shall be noncommercial and
limited in scope and duration).
24
Tsai, supra note 10, at 1067 (discussing the developed nations stance of greater intellectual
property protection, while developing nations “have argued that the strict limitations of the TRIPS
Agreement have overly restricted users’ interests in pharmaceutical technology, especially in the
context of health crises . . . .”).
25
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31(f), at 1210.
26
See Tsai, supra note 10, at 1068 (discussing how Article 31(f) presented significant barriers
to developing countries because those with manufacturing capacity cannot recoup production costs
through exportation and those countries without manufacturing capacity cannot import drugs from
manufacturing countries).
27
Doha Declaration, supra note 16, ¶ 1.
28
Id. ¶ 4.
29
Id. ¶ 6:
We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the
TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an
expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General
Council before the end of 2002.
23
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In response, the TRIPs Council rendered a decision in 2003 (2003 Council
Decision). 30 The Decision stated that certain countries are eligible to import
pharmaceuticals under a compulsory license. 31 Eligible countries include least
developed nations, and nations under certain emergency or other limited
circumstances. 32 The Decision also emphasized the narrow scope of the license33
and implemented certain procedural requirements. For example, the TRIPs
Council must be notified when the importing and exporting countries decide to
use a compulsory license. 34 Other requirements regulate special packaging 35 and
state that remuneration to the patent holder only needs to be paid by one of the
countries. 36

30

Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Decision of the General
Council: Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003) (on file with author), http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm [hereinafter 2003 Council Decision].
31
Id. ¶ 1(b).
32
See id.
33
See id. ¶ 2(b)(i) (noting that the compulsory license should be for “only the amount
necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing Member(s) may be manufactured under the
license and the entirety of this production shall be exported to the Member(s) which has notified
its needs to the Council for TRIPS . . . .”).
34
See id. ¶ 2(a) (providing that the importing member must notify the TRIPs Council); Id. ¶
2(c) (providing that the exporting member must notify the TRIPs Council).
35
Id. ¶ 2(b)(ii):
Products produced under the license shall be clearly identified as being
produced under the system set out in this Decision through specific
labeling or marking. Suppliers should distinguish such products
through special packaging and/or special colouring/shaping of the
products themselves, provided that such distinction is feasible and does
not have a significant impact on price.
Id. ¶ 2(b)(iii) (“[B]efore shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a website . . . the following
information: the quantities being supplied to each destination as referred to in indent (i) above; and
the distinguishing features of the product(s) referred to in indent (ii) above . . . .”).
36
Id. ¶ 3:
Where a compulsory license is granted by an exporting Member under
the system set out in this Decision, adequate remuneration pursuant to
Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be paid in that Member
taking into account the economic value to the importing Member of the
use that has been authorized in the exporting Member. Where a
compulsory license is granted for the same products in the eligible
importing Member, the obligation of that Member under Article 31(h)
shall be waived in respect of those products for which remuneration in
accordance with the first sentence of this paragraph is paid in the
exporting Member.
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In addition to the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Council Decision, WTO
member nations have debated implementing Article 31bis. 37 Article 31bis is an
amendment to the TRIPs Agreement that would replace the 2003 Council
Decision. 38 Article 31bis would provide a specific regime for the exportation of
pharmaceuticals under a compulsory license. 39 As of the date of this paper the
amendment is pending, needing the approval of two thirds of the WTO’s
membership. 40 WTO members have until December 31, 2011 to approve the
amendment. 41 The United States was the first to accept Article 31bis on
December 17, 2005. 42 Other countries later followed suit including India and
Canada. 43 Despite the fact that it has not been sufficiently approved, Article
31bis is the subject of much criticism and political discussion. Pharmaceutical
companies lobby against it because of concerns of re-importation. 44 Even
proponents of compulsory legislation criticize Article 31 bis for being too
complex. 45
Many countries have implemented a compulsory licensing exportation regime
based on Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement, the Article 31bis amendment and
the Doha Declaration, including China, 46 India 47 and Canada, 48 with the notable

37

Press Release, World Trade Organization, Members OK Amendment to Make Health
Flexibility Permanent (Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr426_e.htm.
38
Decision of the General Council, Amendment of the TRIPs Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 6,
2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm. The specific text
of Article 31bis can be found in the Annex to the Protocol Amending the TRIPs Agreement
section of the amendment.
39
See id.
40
World Trade Organization, Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPs Agreement,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last updated Feb. 8, 2010).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See id.
44
See Posting of Shamnad Basheer to Spicy IP, http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2008/01/
doha-style-compulsory-licenses-for.html (Jan. 31, 2008, 18:40 IST) (stating that pharmaceutical
companies are concerned that the compulsory licensing regime will harm their full-price sales,
through political pressure and re-sales from the original countries of importations).
45
See id. (noting that proponents of compulsory licensing have criticized the WTO licensing
regime as time consuming and expensive).
46
She Ji Gong Gong Jian Kang Wen Ti de Zhuan li Shi Shi Qiang Zhi Xu Ke Zheng Ban Fa
(Di 37 Hao) [Relating to Public Health Issues, the Implementation of Compulsory Licensing of
Patented Method (Order No. 37)] (promulgated by the State Intellectual Prop. Office, Nov. 29,
2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006).
47
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005; INDIA CODE (2005), available at http://
indiacode.nic.in/.
48
Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, §§ 21.01-21.2 (1985), available at http://laws.justice.
gc.ca/ eng/P-4/page-6.html#anchorbo-ga:s_21_01.
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exception of the United States. 49 Canada and India are the only countries in
which compulsory licensing for exportation has been attempted. 50
III. CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION AND USAGE OF THE COMPULSORY LICENSING
EXPORTATION REGIME
In this section, Canada’s and India’s compulsory licensing regimes, and their
experiences under each regime, are compared. On a spectrum of compulsory
licensing provisions, Canada—at one extreme—is too complex, while India—at
the other extreme—is too vague. 51
A. Complexities in the Current Canadian Access to Medicines Regime
The Canadian government developed CAMR in 2005, amending both the
Canadian Patent Act 52 and the Canadian Food & Drugs Act. 53 The amendment to
the Patent Act identifies who can apply for a compulsory license, the application
process, royalty requirements and grounds for termination of the license. 54 The
application process is complex. 55 For example, the applicant must negotiate with
the patent holder for at least thirty days before applying. 56 In addition, the
application itself has numerous requirements. 57 CAMR also allows the patent
49

In 2006, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) introduced Senate Bill No. 3175: Life-Saving
Medicines Export Act of 2006 to Congress. S. 3175, 109th Cong. (2006). The bill would have
amended Title 35 of the U.S. Code to grant the exportation of patented pharmaceuticals under a
compulsory license. The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, but never became
law. Govtrack.us, S. 3175: Life-Saving Medicines Export Act of 2006, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd? bill=s109-3175 (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (emphasizing the bill was not
passed after two readings to Congress and was then referred to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary).
50
See Emily Ng & Jillian C. Kohler, Finding Flaws: the Limitations of Compulsory Licensing
for Improving Access to Medicines—an International Comparison, 16 HEALTH L.J. 143, 163–69
(2008).
51
See id.
52
Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, §§ 21.01-21.2.
53
Canadian Food and Drugs Act, C.R.C., ch. 870, §§ C.01.001-C.09.035 (2009), http://laws.
justice.gc.ca/eng/F-27/page-2.html#anchorbo-ga:l_II-gb:s_37.
54
See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, §§ 21.01-21.2. Schedules 2, 3 and 4 lay out
which countries are eligible importers and Section 21.03(1) permits Schedule amendments subject
to certain criteria. The application process is discussed in Section 21.04. The royalty
requirements are set out in Section 21.08. The termination of the license is set out in Sections
21.13 and 21.14.
55
See Paige E. Goodwin, Right Idea, Wrong Result—Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime,
34 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 573 (2008).
56
See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 21.04(3)(c); relevant language, infra APPENDIX,
at 151.
57
See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 21.04(2); relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at
150–51.
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holder to litigate the amount of royalty payments. 58 Allowing for litigation
surrounding royalty payments creates uncertainty with respect to the application
process. 59
Some of the requirements in the current CAMR go beyond what the TRIPs
Agreement requires. For example, CAMR sets a two-year time limit to the
license 60 whereas the TRIPs Agreement requires only that the license be limited
in duration. 61 Also, CAMR provides a schedule of which pharmaceuticals can be
licensed. 62 In contrast, the TRIPs Agreement does not require defining specific
pharmaceuticals that can be produced under a license, 63 but instead the TRIPs
Council defined pharmaceutical products broadly in their 2003 Council
Decision. 64
A Canadian government commissioned review of CAMR was published in
May 2007. 65 The review included information from various stakeholders from
pharmaceutical manufacturers to non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”). 66
Manufacturers of predominantly patented brand name pharmaceuticals, referred
to as the “innovative pharmaceutical industry” throughout the report, believed that
many of the CAMR provisions were necessary to adequately protect their rights. 67
In contrast, NGOs and manufacturers of predominantly generic pharmaceuticals
(“generic companies”) had many suggestions for changing CAMR. For instance,
NGOs called for a broadening of the—definition of pharmaceuticals,68 and both
NGOs and many generic companies suggested an overhaul of the application
58

See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 21.08(4); relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at

152.
59

See Penner & Armstrong, supra note 7, at 373.
See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 21.09; relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at
152. The two-year time limit may be renewed for another two years pursuant to Section 21.12.
61
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31(c), at 1209 (“[T]he scope and duration of such
use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor
technology shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice determined after
judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive . . . .”); Goodwin, supra note 55, at 582
(noting that CAMR goes beyond the TRIPs Agreement with the two-year time limit).
62
Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, Schedule 1.
63
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31, at 1209-10; Goodwin, supra note 55, at 579.
64
See 2003 Council Decision, supra note 30, ¶ 1(a).
65
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, REPORT ON THE STATUTORY REVIEW OF SECTIONS 21.01 TO
21.19 OF THE PATENT ACT (2007), http://camr-rcam.hc-sc.gc.ca/review-reviser/ camr_rcam_
report_rapport-eng.pdf [hereinafter GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, 2007 REPORT].
66
Id. at 6.
67
See generally id. (analyzing the concerns of “innovative pharmaceutical” companies
throughout).
68
Id. at 10 (stating that the list of pre-approved pharmaceutical products eligible for export
should be eliminated or broadened in order to better meet the needs of developing countries).
60
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process. 69 Although all stakeholders unanimously supported the current royalty
formula, NGOs and generic companies noted that allowing the patent holder to
litigate for additional royalties discouraged uptake of CAMR. 70 In the end, the
report concluded that an overhaul of the current regime was unnecessary. 71
B. Complexities in CAMR as Illustrated by the Canadian/Rwandan Experience
Under CAMR, Canada exported medication to Rwanda using a compulsory
license. 72 Apotex Inc., a Canadian generic pharmaceutical manufacturer,
attempted to negotiate a voluntary license with three pharmaceutical companies
holding patents to the HIV/AIDS cocktail Apo TriAvir in May 2007. 73 After
negotiations failed, Apotex applied for and was granted a compulsory license in
August 2007. 74 Both Canada and Rwanda notified the WTO of their intent to use
a compulsory license for the drug cocktail, as required by the 2003 Council
Decision and the CAMR application. 75 More than a year after this notification,
Rwanda received its first shipment of generic HIV/AIDS drugs. 76
This example illustrates some of the current problems with CAMR. 77 First,
the cocktail that Apotex wanted to use was not included on CAMR’s schedule of
drugs. 78 Thus, Canada first had to amend the schedule. 79 Second, Apotex faced
problems during the CAMR required negotiations, because CAMR did not clearly
state what the applicant needed to show. 80 More than a year elapsed between
notification to the WTO and delivery of the drugs, revealing the time consuming
nature of CAMR, which stems from its complexities, as discussed above. 81

69

See id. at 13 (proposing several alternatives to the application process).
Id. at 17.
71
See GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, 2007 REPORT, supra note 65, at 40; Penner & Armstrong,
supra note 7, at 376 (noting that the Report’s conclusion of how “the Government should focus on
non-legislative measures” was mainly due to the fact that Rwanda had applied for a compulsory
license).
72
See Tsai, supra note 10, at 1076–80.
73
Id. at 1078.
74
Id. at 1079.
75
Id.
76
See Shipment Record, Apotex, Rwanda: Apo-Triavir, http://www.apotex.com/apotriavir/
product/rwanda_shipments.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2010); Press Release, Apotex, Second
Shipment of Life-Saving Aids Drug Leaving for Africa (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.apotex.
com/global/about/press/20090918.asp (stating that a second shipment was sent to Rwanda).
77
See Tsai, supra note 10.
78
See id. at 1077.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1078.
81
See id. at 1079.
70
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C. Vagueness in India’s Current Compulsory Licensing Regime
India amended its patent law to add a compulsory licensing for exportation
regime in 2005 through the addition of Section 92A. 82 The regime is a relatively
short provision in comparison to CAMR. 83 Section 92A allows for a compulsory
license to be given to any country having “insufficient or no manufacturing
capacity” under terms set forth by the Indian Controller General of Patents.84
Unlike CAMR, the Indian provision does not set out a specific schedule of
pharmaceuticals that can be manufactured, but instead gives a broad definition. 85
In addition, the provision for India does not include certain TRIPs Agreement
requirements, such as indicating the amount of pharmaceutical product to be
produced. 86 This stands in contrast to CAMR, which provides for such
requirements in the application process. 87 In fact CAMR, as noted above, goes
beyond the TRIPs Agreement requirements in certain circumstances. 88 In
contrast to CAMR, the Indian regime is vague because of its broad scope and
silence on certain international requirements. 89

82

The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15 of 2005, INDIA CODE (2005), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/.
83
See id.
84
Id. §§ 92(A)(1), 92 (A)(2).
85
See id. (stating that pharmaceutical product is defined as “[A]ny patented product, or
product manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address
public health problems and shall be inclusive of ingredients necessary for their manufacture and
diagnostic kits required for their use”).
86
See Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s
Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 604
(2007):
[I]n contrast with the TRIPS framework, India’s Section 92A is
completely silent on any obligation of the Indian government or the
compulsory licensee to specify the amount of pharmaceutical products
that will be exported, to specially label or mark those products, or make
public any information about the export by posting to a website or other
means of publication.
87
See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, §§ 21.01-21.2 (1985), available at http://laws.
justice.gc.ca/eng/P-4/page-6.html#anchorbo-ga:s_21_01.
88
See Greenbaum, supra note 8, at 158.
89
See Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 166 (discussing ambiguity in the Indian legislation);
Mueller, supra note 86, at 604 (discussing the Indian provision’s silence in respect to certain
TRIPs Agreement requirements).
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D. Vagueness in Section 92A as Illustrated by the Indian/Nepal Experience
Natco Pharma Ltd., an Indian generic pharmaceutical manufacturer, applied to
the Indian government for a compulsory license in September 2007. 90 The
license was requested to produce anti-cancer drugs which would be exported to
Nepal. 91 Pfizer, one of the patent holders, challenged the application in the Indian
court system, and the court granted Pfizer a hearing. 92 In September 2008, Natco
reportedly withdrew the application. 93 Litigation stemming from ambiguities in
the Indian regime delayed and possibly resulted in blocking the compulsory
license. 94
Indian and Canadian compulsory licensing schemes are viewed as two
extremes in a spectrum of licensing provisions. 95 The Indian provision can be
viewed as too vague, and the fact that Natco withdrew the application is an
indication of this. 96 On the other hand, the Canadian regime has been criticized
as too complex. 97 Clearly, reform in this area of patent law is necessary for both
legal and policy reasons.

90

See Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 166; see generally Latha Jishnu, Cancer Drug Puts
License, Patent Rules to Test, BUS. STANDARD, Jan. 16, 2008, http://www.business-standard.
com/india/storypage.php?autono=310813.
91
See Posting of Shamnad Basheer to SpicyIP, http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2008/01/
roche-vs-natco-indias-first-doha-style.html (Jan. 16, 2008, 16:44 IST) (noting that the application
specified the amount to be produced, which is not a specified requirement under the Indian
compulsory licensing provision, Section 92A, but is required under the TRIPs Agreement). This
may suggest that while the regime is vague, the implementation of the regime may add
clarification, at least in certain areas.
92
See Posting of Shamnad Basheer to SpicyIP, http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2008/09/
breaking-news-natco-withdraws-doha.html (Sept. 28, 2008, 23:11 IST).
93
Id.
94
See id. (suggesting that Natco may have withdrawn the application out of fear it would lose
on the merits); Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 168 (noting that it is unclear whether a hearing
should be granted to the patent holders, as the Indian provision, Section 92A, does not specify that
this is a right granted under the regime).
95
See, e.g., Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 163–69.
96
See generally id. (discussing the vagueness of the Indian regime).
97
News Release, Jack Kay, President and COO, Apotex, The Apotex Experience with
Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (Apr. 23, 2007), http://www.canadiangenerics.ca/en/
news/apr_23_07_kay.asp [hereinafter Kay]. This was a presentation by Jack Kay to the Canadian
House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology.
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IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO CAMR
A. Lack of TRIPS Compliance in the Proposed Changes to CAMR
This section sets out major changes to CAMR, which propose to streamline
the compulsory licensing process. 98 These changes are in response to criticisms
levied against the current CAMR. 99 The criticisms can be separated into three
main categories: complexity, balancing of interests, and lack of incentives. While
the proposed amendments address these criticisms, they create a regime that is not
complaint with TRIPs Agreement requirements.
1. Complexity in the Current CAMR Regime
Apotex Inc., the Canadian generic pharmaceutical manufacturer, discussed
problems it had experienced with CAMR before the Canadian House of
Commons Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology. 100 Apotex
President and COO, Jack Kay, noted the complexity of CAMR, stating that the
requirements were, “impossible to navigate.” 101 The complexity of the current
CAMR regime is also echoed by importing countries. 102 Specifically, much of
the complexity of the current CAMR regime is based on the application
process. 103 Proposed legislation would repeal several CAMR application
requirements. 104 Important changes include deleting the requirement to state the
maximum quantity of pharmaceuticals that will be produced, 105 and repealing the
need to note information about the version of the pharmaceutical product and
information regarding the importing country. 106 Instead, the amended statute
would merely require the name of the pharmaceutical product and “any other
information that may be prescribed.” 107 In this way, the proposed amendment
contains vague language, which may create uncertainty as to what information is
necessary in order to apply.
98

See Debates, Wasylycia-Leis, supra note 13, at 1335–40.
See id.
100
See Kay, supra note 97.
101
Id.
102
See Christina Cotter, The Implications of Rwanda’s Paragraph 6 Agreement with Canada
for Other Developing Countries, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L. L. REV. 177, 187 (2008).
103
See Goodwin, supra note 55, at 582–83.
104
See Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009,
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4329904&Language=e&Mod
e=1. Paragraph 4(2) would revise Section 21.04(2) of the Canadian Patent Act. See relevant
language, infra APPENDIX, at 150–51.
105
See id.
106
See id.
107
Id.
99
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Thus, the proposed amendment would move CAMR’s application closer
toward the Indian side of the spectrum. As with the Indian provision, vague
language in the CAMR provision may raise speculation on whether it is compliant
with international agreements. 108 In particular, the amendments to CAMR would
delete the requirement to state the maximum quantity of pharmaceuticals that
would be produced under the license. 109 The 2003 Council Decision states that
the importing country should notify the TRIPs Council of the expected quantity of
the product. 110 The TRIPs Council stated that a compulsory license shall be
issued for “only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing
Member(s) . . . .” 111 Therefore, by deleting the need to state the maximum
quantity of pharmaceuticals to be produced, the proposed amendment is not
compliant with the TRIPs Agreement. 112 Still, the implementation of the
proposed changes may clarify compliance. For example, application materials,
including forms, are currently available on the CAMR website. 113 If the
Canadian government decides to continue this practice after the passage of the
amendments, such materials may provide some clarity. However, as the proposed
amendment is written, compliance with the TRIPs Agreement requirements is not
guaranteed.
The proposed amendments to CAMR would also change the conditions for
granting a compulsory license. Currently, the negotiating provision in CAMR
requires a thirty day mandatory negotiation period with the patent holder. 114 The
proposed amendment would replace this requirement, stating that a compulsory
license will be granted, “if the applicant has complied with the prescribed
requirements.” 115 Again, the amendment appears to move CAMR towards the

108

See Mueller, supra note 86, at 605 (noting India’s Section 92A’s silence on certain parts of
the TRIPs Agreement compulsory licensing framework may raise questions as to its compliance).
In addition to raising speculation about compliance, the creation of a vague provision may also
lead to uncertainty in the application process, as illustrated by the Nepal/India example. See Ng &
Kohler, supra note 50, at 166–69.
109
See Bill C-393, 40th Parl. Paragraph 4(2) would revise Section 21.04(2) of the Canadian
Patent Act. See relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 150–51.
110
See 2003 Council Decision, supra note 30, ¶¶ 2(a)(i), 2(b)(i).
111
Id. ¶ 2(b)(i).
112
See Debates, Garneau, supra note 15, at 1350.
113
Government of Canada, Canadian Access to Medicines Regime, Forms, http://www.camrrcam.gc.ca/doc/form/index_e.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
114
See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 21.04(3)(c) (1985), available at http://laws.
justice.gc.ca/eng/P-4/page-6.html#anchorbo-ga:s_21_01; relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at
151–52.
115
See Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, ¶
4(3), (1st reading 25 May 2009), http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?
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Indian side of the spectrum. 116 The vague language in the provision again raises
questions about the adequacy of CAMR meeting international agreements. 117
TRIPs Article 31 allows for a waiver of the negotiation requirement, “in the case
of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of
public non-commercial use.” 118
A general repeal of the negotiation requirement, along with repeal of a
specific schedule of pharmaceuticals, leads to a waiver greater in scope than
allowed by the TRIPs Agreement. 119 In this respect, the proposed amendment
could be seen as the opposite of current CAMR legislation. The current CAMR
goes beyond what is required in the TRIPs Agreement, by requiring a negotiation
period of thirty days, with no option for a waiver. 120 The proposed amendment
would not only repeal the mandatory negotiation period, but would not require
any negotiation whatsoever. 121 Therefore, while the proposed repealing of the
negotiation provision may be an effort to lessen the complexity of the current
CAMR regime, it may go too far, leading to questions of compliance. 122
2. Balancing of Interests
Apotex Inc. also criticized 123 CAMR for attempting to balance the interests of
large, brand name pharmaceutical companies to the detriment of the regime. 124
For example, the current CAMR allows for the patent holder to litigate for an

DocId=4329904&Language=e&Mode=1. Paragraph 4(3) would revise Section 21.04(3) of the
Canadian Patent Act. See relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 151–52.
116
Compare Bill C-393, 40th Parl. (proposing changes to CAMR), with The Patents
(Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15 of 2005; INDIA CODE (2005), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/
(where Section 92A mirrors the language of the proposed changes in Bill C-393).
117
See Mueller, supra note 86, at 603 (noting how India’s Section 92A’s silence regarding
certain parts of the TRIPs Agreement compulsory licensing framework may raise questions as to
its compliance). The proposed amendment would leave CAMR silent on certain TRIPs
Agreement requirements, leading to similar questions. In fact, questions have been raised during
the reading of the bill in the Canadian House of Commons. See Debates, Garneu, supra note 15,
1350.
118
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31(b), at 1209.
119
See Debates, Garneu, supra note 15, 1350.
120
See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 21.04(3)(c) (1985), available at http://laws.
justice.gc.ca/eng/P-4/page-6.html#anchorbo-ga:s_21_01; relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at
152.
121
See Bill C-393, 40th Parl. Paragraph 4(3) would revise Section 21.04(3) of the Canadian
Patent Act. See relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 151.
122
See Debates, Garneu, supra note 15, at 1350.
123
See GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, 2007 REPORT, supra note 65, at 18–19 (stating similar
criticisms by NGOs and generic companies at the time of CAMR’s 2007 review).
124
Kay, supra note 97.
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increase in royalties. 125 The proposed bills would repeal the section of CAMR
which allows for the Canadian Federal Court to determine a larger royalty.126
This proposed legislation may indicate a change in balancing these interests.
Repealing the patent holders’ right to litigate for increased royalties would
decrease uncertainty in the application process brought by the possibility of
litigation. 127
However, repealing these requirements may render the amended CAMR noncompliant with TRIPs Agreement requirements. 128 Article 31 of the TRIPs
Agreement requires that the patent holder receive adequate remuneration and that
decisions regarding remuneration be reviewable by the courts or higher
authority. 129 Removing the right of the patent holder to litigate the issue of
remuneration removes the review process as required by the TRIPs Agreement. 130
Therefore, the act of removing the royalty litigation provision, without providing
for any other form of review, is not compliant with the TRIPs Agreement. 131
In addition, the pharmaceutical industry would likely argue that removal of
this subsection substantially decreases their rights as patent holders. Pressure
placed on the importing countries from pharmaceutical companies is one of the
major reasons cited for the lack of success of the exportation of pharmaceuticals
under compulsory licenses. 132 Importing countries often depend on donations by
developed countries to buy patented medicines from these nations’
pharmaceutical companies. 133 Decreasing remedies available to the patent
holders will likely not do anything to improve their opinion of the compulsory
125

See Canadian Patent Act, ch. P-4, § 21.08(4); relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 152.
Bill C-393, 40th Parl. Paragraph 8(2) would revise Section 21.08(4) of the Canadian
Patent Act. See relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 152.
127
See Penner & Armstrong, supra note 7, at 370 (noting that NGOs and generic companies
criticized CAMR for the uncertainty brought to the regime by the royalty and validity provision).
By repealing these provisions, the revised CAMR would appear to place emphasis on the
applicants rather than on the rights holder.
128
Debates, Garneu, supra note 15.
129
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 31(h), at 1210 (“[T]he right holder shall be paid
adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value
of the authorization); 31(j), at 1210 (“[A]ny decision relating to the remuneration provided in
respect of such use shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct
higher authority in that Member….”).
130
See Debates, Garneu, supra note 15.
131
Id.
132
Cotter, supra note 102, at 187.
133
See id. (quoting a health activist discussing the pressure from pharmaceutical companies,
“[i]f I’m sitting here, and I’m in Malawi, and I’ve got $200 million annually from the U.S. for
drugs as long as I buy patented drugs, do you think I’m going to thumb my nose at that? It’s part
of the bigger architecture”).
126
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licensing scheme, and applicants may feel additional pressure not to use the
regimes.
3. Lack of Incentives
Another criticism of CAMR is the lack of incentives it provides for generic
companies. 134 The proposed legislation deals with one aspect of incentives: it
allows generic companies to practice economies of scale.135 Under the proposed
amendment to the application process, the application no longer has to state the
maximum amount of product that will be produced. 136 In addition, the time
period requirement, which is currently a two-year term of production, which can
be extended for another two years, would also be repealed. 137 Therefore, generic
manufacturers would potentially be able to produce a larger amount of medication
at a lower cost to themselves and the respective importing county. 138
However, repealing the requirement to specify the maximum amount of
pharmaceuticals to be produced and the time limit may lead to questions about the
scope of the license. Article 31, subdivision (c) of the TRIPs Agreement provides
that a compulsory license should be limited in both scope and duration. 139 By not
providing for a time limit, 140 or for an amount of pharmaceuticals that can be
134

See id. at 187–88.
See Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities: Analysis of WTO Action Regarding Paragraph
6 of Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 613, 703 (2004) (describing economies of scale as important to the generics industry):
Economies of scale can be viewed from the perspective of either the
producer or the purchaser. From a producer perspective, increased
production distributes fixed costs over a greater number of units,
thereby reducing overall costs per unit. Thus, the more that is produced
and sold to consumers, the lower the average cost of producing that
unit. This acts as an incentive for producers to manufacture more units.
The purchaser benefits from economies of scale along the same
premise, as purchasing more units decreases the per-unit cost. Think of
it as buying in bulk.
See also Mike Gumbel, Is Article 31bis Enough? The Need to Promote Economies of Scale in
the International Compulsory Licensing System, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 161, 172 (2008).
136
Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, (1st
reading 25 May 2009), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?
DocId=4329904&Language=e&Mode=1. Paragraph 4(2) would revise Section 21.04(2) of the
Canadian Patent Act. See relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 150–51.
137
Bill C-393, 40th Parl. Paragraph 9 would revise Section 21.09 of the Canadian Patent Act.
See relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 152.
138
See Gumbel, supra note 135, at 172.
139
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31(c), at 1209; Debates, Garneu, supra note 15.
140
The Indian legislation similarly does not provide for a time limit; however Section 92A(2)
provides that the Controller will grant a license, “under such terms and conditions as may be
135
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produced, the proposed amendment would, in my opinion, significantly broaden
the scope of the license. Such a broad scope would not comport with the TRIPs
Agreement. 141
Although the proposed changes to CAMR attempt to remedy complaints
levied at the current regime by NGOs and generic companies, the proposed
changes remove much of the language from the current provisions, leading to a
license that is broader in scope. In fact, the scope of the amended provisions
would be so broad as to render them noncompliant with the TRIPs Agreement. 142
B. Positive Proposed Changes to CAMR
While many changes to CAMR broaden the scope of the compulsory license
to a point that is not compliant with the TRIPs Agreement, several proposed
amendments reflect positive changes. This section compares these changes to
other nations’ compulsory licensing legislation and suggests that other countries
should consider their implementation.
For example, the proposed amendment takes a positive step in broadening the
definition of pharmaceuticals. 143 The proposed legislation would change the
definition of pharmaceutical products eligible for the license from those listed in
Schedule 1. 144 The proposed legislation would define pharmaceuticals as, “any
drug, as defined in section 2 of the Food and Drugs Act, and includes monitoring
products and products used in conjunction with a pharmaceutical product.” 145 In
addition, the proposed amendment would allow for the manufacture of active
ingredients. 146 The 2003 Council Decision stated that active ingredients should
be included in a definition of pharmaceutical products; however it also included
diagnostic kits. 147 While it is unclear whether or not the proposed amendment
specified and published by him.” The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 92A(2); INDIA
CODE (2005), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/.
141
See Debates, Garneu, supra note 15.
142
Id.
143
But see Debates, Garneu, supra note 15 (criticizing the repealing of Schedule 1 of CAMR
—the list of eligible pharmaceuticals to be produced—as rendering Canada in “default of its
international trade treaty obligations under the TRIPS agreement.”).
144
Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, Schedule 1 (1985), available at http://laws.justice.
gc.ca/eng/P-4/page-20.html#anchorsc:1.
145
Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, ¶ 2
(1st reading 25 May 2009), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.
aspx?DocId=4329904&Language=e&Mode=1. Paragraph 2 would revise Section 21.02 of the
Canadian Patent Act. See relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 148.
146
See Bill C-393, 40th Parl. Paragraph 4(1) would revise Section 21.04(1.1) of the Canadian
Patent Act. See relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 148.
147
See 2003 Council Decision , supra note 30, ¶ 1(a):
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would include diagnostic kits, 148 broadening the definition of pharmaceuticals can
be seen as a positive step, embodying the spirit of the 2003 Council Decision.
The European Union (EU) and the Republic of Korea, have already
implemented flexible definitions that include active ingredients and diagnostic
kits. 149 A broad, flexible definition of pharmaceutical products is critical in
providing for better access to medicines, as illustrated by Apotex’s experiences
under the current CAMR. Apotex had difficulty with obtaining a compulsory
license under the current CAMR because the desired pharmaceuticals were not
included on Schedule 1, the list of approved pharmaceuticals of CAMR. 150
Because providing better access to medicines is a vital purpose of the Doha
Declaration, 151 countries should provide for a broad definition of pharmaceutical
products to allow for such access. 152 The proposed legislation clearly broadens
the definition of pharmaceuticals, and is thus a positive step.
Furthermore, another positive change that the proposed legislation presents is
redefining which countries are eligible to apply for a compulsory license under
CAMR. Under the proposed legislation, eligible parties would be countries
recognized by the United Nations as least developed countries, or named by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) as eligible
for official development assistance. 153 The current CAMR, in discussing eligible
‘pharmaceutical product’ means any patented product, or product
manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector
needed to address the public health problems as recognized in
paragraph 1 of the Declaration. It is understood that active ingredients
necessary for its manufacture and diagnostic kits needed for its use
would be included . . . .
148
While diagnostic kits are not specifically mentioned in the proposed definition, the
amended definition would include, “products used in conjunction with a pharmaceutical product.”
Bill C-393, ¶ 2. This could possibly be construed as a diagnostic kit. Paragraph 4(1) would revise
Section 21.04(1.1) of the Canadian Patent Act.
149
Council Regulation 816/2006, art. 2(1), 2006 O.J. (L 157) 1 (EC), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:157:0001:0007:EN:PDF; Republic of
Korea Patent Act (amended 2005), No. 950, art. 107(8), available at http://lists.essential.org/
pipermail/ip-health/2005-November/008728.html.
150
See Tsai, supra note 10, at 1077.
151
Doha Declaration, supra note 16, ¶ 3, at 746.
152
See Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 155 (suggesting that the best definition of
pharmaceutical products is “Norway’s Regulations, section 108, which define ‘pharmaceutical
products’ as those ‘covered by paragraph 1 (a) of the General Council Decision.’”).
153
Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, 3(1)
(1st reading 25 May 2009), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.
aspx?DocId=4329904&Language=e&Mode=1. Paragraph 3(1) would revise Section 21.03(1) of
the Canadian Patent Act. See relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 148.
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participants in the regime, distinguishes between countries that are members of
the WTO and those that are not. 154 The proposed amendment would remove this
distinction. 155 This change would put CAMR more in line with India’s
legislation. 156 India has been praised for not making this distinction. 157 In
contrast, the Republic of Korea’s law requires a showing of “insufficient or no
manufacturing capacity” of non-WTO members who are not least developed
nations, essentially requiring more of non-WTO member countries. 158
While the 2003 Council Decision discusses importing countries as “eligible
importing Member,” 159 India and the EU have not limited their compulsory
licensing provisions to WTO member nations. 160 In addition, civil society
advocates argue that the 2003 Council Decision does not limit nations in choosing
to provide for exportation to non-WTO member nations. 161 Because access to
medicines is considered part of the fundamental right to human health by the
General Assembly of the United Nations, distinctions should not be created with
respect to a nation’s WTO membership status. 162 Thus, the proposed legislation’s
deletion of consideration of a prospective importing nation’s WTO status can be
seen as a positive step that other countries should consider.

154

See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 21.03(1)(b) (1985), available at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/P-4/page-6.html#anchorbo-ga:s_21_01; relevant language, infra
APPENDIX, at 148–49.
155
See Bill C-393, 40th Parl., ¶ 3(1). Paragraph 3(1) would revise Section 21.03(1) of the
Canadian Patent Act. See relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 148–49.
156
The Indian legislation would remain broader, only requiring that a country have
insufficient manufacturing capacity. The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 92A;
INDIA CODE (2005), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/. In addition, the EU also includes
countries named on the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s list. Council Regulation
816/2006, art. 4(c), 2006 O.J. (L 157) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:157:0001:0007:EN:PDF.
157
See Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 153 (noting that access to medicines is a fundamental
right that should not be based on WTO membership).
158
Republic of Korea Patent Act (amended 2005), No. 950, art. 107(7)(ii), available at:
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2005-November/008728.html. See Ng & Kohler,
supra note 50, at 153 (discussing the Korean provision, which requires that non-WTO members
must show sufficient evidence of lack of manufacturing capacity and what constitutes sufficient
evidence is not clear).
159
See 2003 Council Decision, supra note 30, ¶ 1(b).
160
See supra text accompanying note 155.
161
See Richard Elliot, Pledges and Pitfalls: Canada’s Legislation on Compulsory Licensing
of Pharmaceuticals for Export, 1 INT’L J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 94, 104 (2006).
162
See Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 151–53.
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Another positive proposal broadens the ability of an importing country to reexport the drugs produced under the compulsory license. 163 This proposed
amendment is an implementation of Paragraph 6(i) of the 2003 Council
Decision. 164 The implementation of the proposed amendment can be seen as both
compliant with the TRIPs Agreement and helpful to incentivize generic
companies to use the CAMR regime. 165 A similar provision can also be found in
EU legislation. 166 The Dutch and Indian provisions are silent on the issue of reimportation, which may lead to uncertainty among importing nations. 167
Therefore, nations should implement a provision allowing for regional trade of the
licensed pharmaceuticals, as suggested by the 2003 Council Decision.

163

See Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, ¶
12(4), (1st reading 25 May 2009), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/
Publication.aspx?DocId=4329904&Language=e&Mode=1 (“Paragraph (1)(g) does not apply if a
product is exported to a party to a relevant regional trade agreement that is not listed in the
Schedule for re-export to parties to the agreement that are listed in the Schedule.”). Paragraph
12(4) would add language to Section 21.14 of the Canadian Patent Act.
164
2003 Council Decision , supra note 30, ¶ 6(i):
With a view to harnessing economies of scale for the purposes of
enhancing purchasing power for, and facilitating the local production
of, pharmaceutical products: (i) where a developing or least-developed
country WTO Member is a party to a regional trade agreement within
the meaning of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the Decision of 28
November 1979 on Differential and More Favorable Treatment
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (L/4903),
at least half of the current membership of which is made up of countries
presently on the United Nations list of least developed countries, the
obligation of that Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement
shall be waived to the extent necessary to enable a pharmaceutical
product produced or imported under a compulsory license in that
Member to be exported to the markets of those other developing or
least developed country parties to the regional trade agreement that
share the health problem in question. It is understood that this will not
prejudice the territorial nature of the patent rights in question . . . .
165
Allowing for re-exportation to regional trading partners allows generic manufactures to
practice economies of scale. See id.
166
See Council Regulation 816/2006, art. 10(4), 2006 O.J. (L 157) 1 (EC), http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:157:0001:0007:EN:PDF.
167
Rijksoctrooiwet 1995 [Patent Act 1995], art. 57(1), Stb. 1995, 51 (Neth.), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/netherlands-export-rules.html; The Patents (Amendment) Act,
No. 15 of 2005, § 92A; INDIA CODE (2005), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, Canadian bills C-393 and S-232 attempt to address many of the
criticisms of the current CAMR. 168 However, in addressing these concerns, the
proposed legislation creates a process that may not be compliant with the TRIPs
Agreement. 169 Specifically, the proposed legislation removes certain language in
the current CAMR, creating a vague regime that can be compared to the Indian
scheme under Section 92A of the Indian Patents Act. 170 The proposed legislation
is likely to be contentious with patent holders, as it removes the negotiation
requirement and the ability for the patent holder to litigate for increased royalties.
Despite these apparent issues, the proposed legislation puts forward several
positive changes that would create a better regime. A broader definition of
pharmaceuticals is a positive change that would codify the spirit of the Doha
Declaration, 171 and incorporate elements of the 2003 Council Decision. 172
Removing the distinction between WTO member nations and non-WTO member
nations would increase access to medicines and, therefore, would be in line with
the Doha Declaration. 173 Lastly, allowing an importing country to re-export the
licensed pharmaceuticals as part of a regional trade agreement would also be a
positive step by directly implementing a provision of the 2003 Council
Decision. 174
Taking the above into account, the proposed legislation should not pass as it is
currently drafted. However, the Canadian government could try to increase use of
CAMR by other means. The 2007 government sponsored review of CAMR
discussed efforts of the Canadian government to tackle the issue of access to
medicines, including publicizing CAMR. 175 However, Apotex, in discussing their
experiences with CAMR, noted that currently CAMR relied on the initiative of
generic manufacturers, but that the government should take the lead. 176 The
Canadian government may want to rethink their allocation of resources with
respect to CAMR. For example, while the Canadian government has raised
168

See Debates, Wasylycia-Leis, supra note 13.
See Debates, Garneu, supra note 15.
170
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 92A; INDIA CODE (2005), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/. In creating a vague regime, the proposed legislation may also create
problems similar to those experienced by India, that is, litigation surrounding the compulsory
licensing applications. See Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 166.
171
Doha Declaration, supra note 16, ¶ 3, at 746.
172
2003 Council Decision, supra note 30, ¶ 1(a).
173
See Doha Declaration, supra note 16, ¶ 17, at 748–49.
174
2003 Council Decision, supra note 30, ¶ 6(i).
175
See GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, 2007 REPORT, supra note 65.
176
See Kay, supra note 97.
169
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awareness of the existence of CAMR, the government could direct more resources
towards navigating the complexities of the regime.
While developing nations may be wary of losing donations from
pharmaceutical companies, potential importing nations may also want to look at
the example of Brazil, which has used the threat of compulsory licensing as
leverage to get pharmaceutical companies to lower their prices.177 Therefore, a
developing nation may not even need to complete the CAMR process to obtain
better access to pharmaceuticals.

177

See Greenbaum, supra note 8, at 154.
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APPENDIX
CURRENT CANADIAN ACCESS TO
MEDICINES REGIME AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

Current CAMR 178

Proposed Amendments:
Bill C-393 179 and Bill S-232 180

21.02 The definitions in this section apply in
this section and in sections 21.03 to 21.19.

2. Section 21.02 of the Act is replaced by the
following:

“pharmaceutical product” means any patented
product listed in Schedule 1 in, if applicable,
the dosage form, the strength and the route of
administration specified in that Schedule in
relation to the product.

210.02 The definitions in this section apply in
sections 21.01 to 21.16.
“authorization” means an authorization granted
under subsection 21.04(1).
“pharmaceutical product” means any drug, as
defined in section 2 of the Food and Drugs Act,
and includes monitoring products and products
used in conjunction with a pharmaceutical
product.

21.03 (1) The Governor in Council may, by
order,

3. (1) Subsections 21.03(1) and (2) of the Act
are replaced by the following:

[Section (a) not included]

21.03 (1) The Governor in Council may, by
order, on the recommendation of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International
Trade and the Minister for International
Cooperation, amend the Schedule to add the
name of a country if the country is
(a) recognized by the United Nations as being a

(b) on the recommendation of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International
Trade and the Minister for International
Cooperation, amend Schedule 2 by adding the
name of any country recognized by the United
178

Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, §§ 21.01-21.2 (1985), available at http://laws.
justice.gc.ca/eng/P-4/page-6.html#anchorbo-ga:s_21_01. The current CAMR regime provisions
have been edited for brevity, but include all Sections relevant to this paper. The original emphasis
remains.
179
Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, (1st
reading 25 May 2009), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?
DocId=4329904&Language=e&Mode=1.
180
Bill S-232, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009,
available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/Senate/Bills/402/public/S-232/S-232_1/S-232_texte.htm. The proposed amendments have been edited for brevity but include all passages relevant to
this paper. The original emphasis has been left in. Language that is underlined indicates new
language to be inserted.
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Nations as being a least-developed country
that has,
(i) if it is a WTO Member, provided the
TRIPS Council with a notice in writing stating
that the country intends to import, in
accordance with the General Council
Decision, pharmaceutical products, as defined
in paragraph 1(a) of that decision, and
(ii) if it is not a WTO Member, provided the
Government of Canada with a notice in
writing through diplomatic channels stating
that the country intends to import
pharmaceutical products, as defined in
paragraph 1(a) of the General Council
Decision, that it agrees that those products
will not be used for commercial purposes and
that it undertakes to adopt the measures
referred to in Article 4 of that decision;
(c) on the recommendation of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International
Trade and the Minister for International
Cooperation, amend Schedule 3 by adding the
name of any WTO Member not listed in
Schedule 2 that has provided the TRIPS
Council with a notice in writing stating that
the WTO Member intends to import, in
accordance with the General Council
Decision, pharmaceutical products, as defined
in paragraph 1(a) of that decision; and
(d) on the recommendation of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International
Trade and the Minister for International
Cooperation, amend Schedule 4 by adding the
name of
(i) any WTO Member not listed in Schedule 2
or 3 that has provided the TRIPS Council with
a notice in writing stating that the WTO
Member intends to import, in accordance with

149

Proposed Amendments:
Bill C-393 179 and Bill S-232 180
least-developed country; or
(b) named on the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development’s list of
countries that are eligible for official
development assistance
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Proposed Amendments:
Bill C-393 179 and Bill S-232 180

the General Council Decision, pharmaceutical
products, as defined in paragraph 1(a) of that
decision, or
(ii) any country that is not a WTO Member
and that is named on the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development’s
list of countries that are eligible for official
development assistance and that has provided
the Government of Canada with a notice in
writing through diplomatic channels
(A) stating that it is faced with a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency,
(B) specifying the name of the pharmaceutical
product, as defined in paragraph 1(a) of the
General Council Decision, and the quantity of
that product, needed by the country to deal
with the emergency or other urgency,
(C) stating that it has no, or insufficient,
pharmaceutical capacity to manufacture that
product, and
(D) stating that it agrees that that product will
not be used for commercial purposes and that
it undertakes to adopt the measures referred to
in Article 4 of the General Council Decision.
[Subsection (2 ) not included]
This language represents a new Subsection
that has no counterpart in the current CAMR.

4. (1) Subsection 21.04(1) of the Act is
replaced by the following:
(1.1) In addition to what is authorized under
subsection (1), an authorization under that
subsection authorizes the person to
(a) manufacture any active ingredient used in
the manufacture of a finished product; and
(b) make, construct and use any patented
invention solely for the purpose of
manufacturing any active pharmaceutical
ingredient used in the manufacture of a finished
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Proposed Amendments:
Bill C-393 179 and Bill S-232 180

Current CAMR 178
product.
21.04(2) The application must be in the
prescribed form and set out
(a) the name of the pharmaceutical product to
be manufactured and sold for export under the
authorization;

4.(2) Subsection 21.04(2) of the Act is
amended by adding “and” at the end of
paragraph (a) and by repealing paragraphs
(b) to (f).

(b) prescribed information in respect of the
version of the pharmaceutical product to be
manufactured and sold for export under the
authorization;
(c) the maximum quantity of the
pharmaceutical product to be manufactured
and sold for export under the authorization;
(d) for each patented invention to which the
application relates, the name of the patentee
of the invention and the number, as recorded
in the Patent Office, of the patent issued in
respect of that invention;
(e) the name of the country or WTO Member
to which the pharmaceutical product is to be
exported;
(f) the name of the governmental person or
entity, or the person or entity permitted by the
government of the importing country, to
which the product is to be sold, and prescribed
information, if any, concerning that person or
entity; and
(g) any other information that may be
prescribed.
21.04 Conditions for granting of
authorization

4.(3) Subsection 21.04(3) of the Act is
replaced by the following:

(3) The Commissioner shall authorize the use
of the patented invention only if

(3) The Commissioner shall grant an
authorization only if the applicant has complied
with the prescribed requirements.
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Proposed Amendments:
Bill C-393 179 and Bill S-232 180

(a) the applicant has complied with the
prescribed requirements, if any;
(b) the Minister of Health has notified the
Commissioner that the version of the
pharmaceutical product that is named in the
application meets the requirements of the
Food and Drugs Act and its regulations,
including the requirements under those
regulations relating to the marking,
embossing, labeling [sic] and packaging that
identify that version of the product as having
been manufactured [subsections (i) and (ii)
not included]
(c) the applicant provides the Commissioner
with a solemn or statutory declaration in the
prescribed form stating that the applicant had,
at least thirty days before filing the
application,
(i) sought from the patentee or, if there is
more than one, from each of the patentees, by
certified or registered mail, a licence to
manufacture and sell the pharmaceutical
product for export to the country or WTO
Member named in the application on
reasonable terms and conditions and that such
efforts have not been successful, and
(ii) provided the patentee, or each of the
patentees, as the case may be, by certified or
registered mail, in the written request for a
licence, with the information that is in all
material respects identical to the information
referred to in paragraphs (2)(a) to (g); and
[Section (d) not included]
21.08 Federal Court may determine royalty
(4) The Federal Court may, in relation to any
authorization, make an order providing for the
payment of a royalty that is greater than the

8.(2) Subsections 21.08(4) to (7) of the Act are
repealed.
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Current CAMR 178

Proposed Amendments:
Bill C-393 179 and Bill S-232 180

royalty that would otherwise be required to be
paid under subsection (1).

21.09 An authorization granted under
subsection 21.04(1) is valid for a period of
two years beginning on the day on which the
authorization is granted.

9. Section 21.09 of the Act is repealed.
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